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CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL 
The following APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
is submitted in good faith and not for purpose of 
delay. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF THE BILL OF PARTICULARS 
WORKED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT 
The Court of Appeals' "Memorandum Decision" 
expressly decides the "theft by deception" charge was 
not proven. This is absolutely correct and on point. 
However, the decision then finds the Defendant guilty 
of the "attempted theft" charge. [Implicit in that 
decision is the fact that the "telephone books" charge 
is seemingly ignored, ostensibly on the basis that the 
telephone books were in fact set out for "free 
distribution" to members of the public. [The free 
distribution was correctly noted in a footnote to the 
"Memorandum Decision" opinion.] Thus, in essence, the 
Court of Appeals has reversed the trial court judge on 
the "photographs" charge (i.e. "theft by deception") 
and proceeded nevertheless to find the Defendant guilty 
of the "attempted theft" charge involving the same 
photographs. 
In responding to the "bill of particulars" 
argument, the "Memorandum Decision" mistakenly focuses 
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upon the "abuse of discretion" standard articulated in 
State vs Swapp, 8 06 p. 2d 115 (Utah Court of Appeals 
1991) . Although the "abuse of discretion" standard 
might be applicable in most cases, the application of 
that standard to the instant case is inappropriate for 
the following reasons. The "abuse of discretion" 
standard is applicable in cases where the trial judge 
is fully informed! In the instant situation, the trial 
judge was AS MUCH CONFUSED as was the Defendant as to 
the true nature of the charges. Thus, in this 
situation, the better analysis is to focus upon what 
has actually happened. [Furthermore, a reading of the 
Swapp decision shows that the prosecution in that case 
carefully including the filing of a 12-page 
affidavit its legal theory of the accused's guilt. 
The defense was not mislead. Nor was there an 
opportunity for the "flip-flopping" of the charges and 
the resultant conviction, as has occurred in the 
instant case.] The problem is not, per se, one of 
"notice" to the accused; rather, the problem involves 
the "shifting target" approach of a vague charging 
document, against which he cannot be expected to 
prepare an "adequate defense", because the charge keeps 
moving as evidenced by the Court's decision! 
It is a fundamental principle of appellate 
3 
jurisprudence that the appellate court does not 
necessarily "weigh" the evidence (as does the trier-of-
fact), but merely reviews the evidence to insure that 
just and proper results have been obtained. In the 
instant decision, the Court of Appeals seemingly has 
"weighed" the evidence on the "attempted theft" charge 
and applied the same to the "photographs". This is 
unfortunate and prejudicial to the Defendant. 
First, the Defendant has been found guilty of an 
offense ("attempted theft" of the photographs) which 
the trial court did not find him guilty of. Secondly, 
the offense of "attempted theft" was so poorly and 
improperly pleaded, it is debatable whether or not the 
trial judge would have found the Defendant guilty of 
that offense, had it been properly charged which it 
was not. 
The material allegations in the Information merely 
recite the phrasing contained in the statute. [It's a 
verbatim recitation of the statutory text! No attempt 
is even made to "personalize" the same to the Defendant 
or to the alleged criminal conduct. The "attempted 
theft" DOES NOT even contain the requisite statutory 
text customarily used to allege an "attempt".] Items 
such as (1) the property description and (2) the victim 
(as owner of that property) are NOT identified. 
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Ifrid fhe Information been properly worded so as to 
allege "attempted theft", the Information would have 
contained at least two "elements" of the alleged 
offense which are material to a conviction: namely, 
that the Defendant (1) undertook a "substantial step" 
toward the commission of the offense, AND (2) that the 
Defendant's action (i.e. the "substantial step") was 
"strongly corroborative of the actor's mental intent" 
necessary for the consummation and/or commission of the 
offense. Thus, the positioning of the photographs was 
very, very material to the charge. However, the trial 
court was apparently not thinking about the 
photographs in the context of the "attempted theft" 
charge; Judge Boyden was pre-occupied with the "theft 
by deception". Thus, was Judge Boyden even cognizant of 
the two elements (i.e. "substantial step" and "strongly 
corroborative of actor's mental intent") insofar as 
such related to the evidence and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom? We don't know. [Although trial judge's 
are probably presumed to know the law in the cases 
presented to them, we cannot safely indulge in that 
presumption in this case. The Court of Appeals has, in 
essence, ruled as a matter of law, that the "theft by 
deception" charge cannot stand and that the evidence 
would not support the conviction. But Judge Boyden was 
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firm in her analysis as to the "deception" . She 
incorrectly applied the law in that particular. Judge 
Boyden was similarly in error on the "single criminal 
episode" aspects of the dual convictions, now made moot 
by the Court of Appeals decision. Could it not be said 
that Judge Boyden charged not only with applying the 
law, but also carefully listening for the operative 
facts misapplied things in the "attempted theft" 
case. She wasn't really listening for the nuances 
associated with that charge, because she was so 
intently focused upon the "deception" charge which she 
thought referred to the photographs and she so found, 
albeit incorrectly on the legal issue. 
The Court of Appeals in a three-judge, unanimous 
decision has now overruled Judge Boyden and has 
properly set aside the "theft by deception" charge. But 
the Court of Appeals has now applied "transferred" is 
a more accurate term the "attempted theft" charge to 
those same photographs! 
Given AS MUCH JUDICIAL CONFUSION as there IS AND 
WAS concerning this case and the evidentiary basis 
needed for this conviction, can the Court of Appeals 
say that the evidence is so compelling that it proves, 
beyond a reasonable doubt", that the Defendant engaged 
in a "substantial step" towards the commission of the 
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offense, which step was simultaneously "strongly 
corroborative" of the requisite mental state needed for 
theft? Since the trial judge didn't make that 
determination (in the context of the "photographs"), 
wouldn't it be better jurisprudentially to allow 
the trial court (on remand) to make that decision? 
The "bill of particulars" issue is NOT MERELY that 
the accused is entitled to know what specific incident 
is before the trial court; the Defendant was well aware 
of the incident. THE ISSUE IS whether or not the 
allegations of criminal conduct are sufficiently 
narrowed so that the accused can "prepare an adequate 
defense". Given the flip-flop status of the case, who 
can say that the Defense would have done things 
differently, if the charged offenses were more 
precisely pleaded? [The prosecutor of those offenses 
who is not appellate counsel will want the most 
"loose" charging document possible: so as to preserve 
the maximum number of options. In this case, it worked: 
Judge Boyden "bought into" the "deception" charge, even 
though that was not, theoretically, what the prosecutor 
set out to prove or at least told the Defendant the 
prosecutor was attempting to prove! In this same vein, 
the Court of Appeals has succumbed to the same 
"looseness": the "Memorandum Decision" results in a 
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"guilty" verdict to the charge opposite to what the 
trial court found! 
Is it that difficult for the prosecution to spell 
out (1) the specific description of the property 
alleged to have been stolen and (2) the "owner" of that 
property? [West Valley City didn't want to assert that 
it was the "owner" of the telephone books, because the 
City wasn't!] Now, when the Court of Appeals has the 
opportunity to set things straight, wouldn't it be 
better to take this opportunity to set things straight 
as far as the "bill of particulars" issue? 
The vague, ambiguous "disclose nothing" allegations 
which are merely the recitation of the statutory 
phrasing a prosecutorial practice already condemned 
by judicial decision in the Bell case [770 P. 2d 100 
(Utah Supreme Court 1988)] ought not be condoned, 
expressly or implicitly. Given the judicial confusion, 
the historic "abuse of discretion" standard for 
reviewing the trial court's decision is not adequate. 
The trial court was, ultimately, as confused as 
everyone due to the prosecution's willful failure to 
provide the necessary information. That failure has 
obviously worked to the prejudice of the accused. 
The prejudicial effect upon the accused is 
illustrated further by this example: 
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IF the charging document (information) had 
expressly alleged as was apparently the 
prosecutions theory of guilt understood by 
the trial judge that the "attempted theft" 
charge related to the "telephone books" which 
were the property of "telephone book company", 
would the Court of Appeals now be so inclined 
to now find the Defendant "guilty" of 
"attempted theft" of the "photographs" as 
"property of the City"? I hope not! 
The prejudice to the Defendant IS ESTABLISHED, 
consistent with the standards articulated in Bell. [In 
this vein, the fact that the Information is so VAGUELY 
WORDED as to allow the flip-flopping of the conviction 
by the Court of Appeals involves the Court of Appeals 
in the very problem that the trial judge was involved 
in all to the accused's detriment!] 
To have the Court of Appeals now "weigh" the 
evidence, without hearing the actual live witnesses and 
seeing their demeanor and ascertaining the nuances 
within their testimony (the proof of the attempt is 
couched in terms of "undertakes a substantial step 
towards the commission of the offense" and that the 
"substantial step" must be "strongly corroborative" of 
the accused's guilty "intent" is error! 
In this regard, it is the function of the Court of 
Appeals to review the conviction to determine whether 
or not there was sufficient evidence to support the 
guilty verdict; it is NOT the function of the Court of 
Appeals as it has now done to evaluate the evidence 
to ascertain whether the accused is in fact guilty of 
an offense which the trial judge didn't find the 
Defendant guilty of! This should be particularly the 
case in a situation which focuses upon the accused's 
"intent" (necessary for a "theft" or "attempted theft" 
conviction)! 
The case should be remanded for re-trial on the 
properly-alleged "attempted theft" charge. 
II 
THE APPELLANTS "UTAH CONSTITUTION" CLAIMS 
HAVE NOT BEEN DECIDED BY THE MCDONALD DECISION 
The Memorandum Decision seemingly notes 
incorrectly that the trial court had decided that 
incarceration was not going to be a sentencing option, 
such having been "eliminated" at the trial court's 
denial of the jury trial! That's what Judge Boyden 
sort-of SAID (at the November trial, when the jury was 
not called or empaneled). But that's NOT what Judge 
Boyden DID (at the December 14th sentencing) . On 
December 14th she sentenced the Defendant to "15 days 
in jail" (on the "theft by deception" charge involving 
the photographs) and "5 days in jail" (on the 
"attempted theft" charge, ostensibly involving the 
telephone books). The execution of those jail terms was 
suspended upon the Defendant's timely performance of 
"80 hours" of "community service". [Although the 
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breakdown of the "80 hours" is not shown on the written 
document prepared by the Clerk of the Court, the 
announced breakdown was 56 hours for the Class B "theft 
by deception" charge (the photographs, now dismissed by 
the Court of Appeals) and 24 hours on the "attempted 
theft" charge (now applied by the Court of Appeals to 
the photographs). No monetary fine was imposed. 
A 
The provisions of the Utah Constitution Sections 
10 AND 12 of Article I thereof are absolutely clear: 
the charged criminal defendant IS ENTITLED to a "jury 
trial". The Defendant made timely written demand for a 
"jury trial". The "jury trial" was scheduled, months 
before the trial date! The trial court's own "daily 
calendar" indicates the case (and other cases that same 
day) were scheduled for "jury trial"! [At the time of 
the denial, the trial court had before it TWO OFFENSES, 
although arising out of the "same criminal episode", 
for which the aggregate incarceration was NINE MONTHS!] 
To now, in hindsight, say the accused was charged with 
a federally-described "petty offense" a phrase not 
found in the Utah Constitution is in error! 
This Court should not countenance the denial of a 
timely-filed jury demand, for an offense for which a 
jury trial is statutorily warranted, merely because the 
14 
trial court doesn't want to call a jury. Furthermore, 
the trial court judge ought not to be making those kind 
of pre-trial inquiries as to the nature of the case 
and/or the criminal background, if any, of the 
Defendant before the trial. To do so unfairly 
prejudices the Defendant! 
The Utah Constitution may afford greater rights to 
accused persons than are afforded rights under the 
corresponding federal (national) Constitution. See, for 
example, Durham, "Employing the Utah Constitution in 
the Utah Courts", Utah Bar Journal, November 198 9, pp. 
25-27. See also State vs Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1990) [holding (in a plurality opinion) 
that automobiles are afforded a greater degree of 
protection under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution than under the United States Constitution 
(Fourth Amendment), which has almost exactly the same 
wording!] . C.f. State vs Strickling, 844 P.2d 979 (Utah 
Court of Appeals 1992) ["A fundamental departure from 
the well-established law regarding inventory searches 
. . . (if) based on the Utah Constitution, must come, 
if at all, from the Utah Supreme Court." 844 P.2d at 
] . 
That the accused's right to a "jury trial" is 
mentioned in TWO separate provisions of the Utah 
12 
Constitution is significant! The right is unqualified 
and absolute! 
B 
In this same vein, the Court's reliance upon the 
West Valley City vs McDonald decision is grossly 
misplaced. McDonald involved a traffic violation! The 
trial judge reduced the charge to an "infraction", thus 
precluding per statute the possibility of sentence 
of incarceration. The Court of Appeals found such to be 
permissible. But to now say as the Memorandum 
Decision does, implicitly and expressly that McDonald 
is precedent authority to deny the Appellant's claims 
is wrong. First, because Judge Boyden DID IMPOSE a 
sentence of incarceration! And secondly, because the 
accused has an absolute "constitutional right" to have 
a jury trial of this very important charge, which has 
serious personal ramifications (i.e. employment, 
veracity as a witness in future proceedings, etc.) 
beyond whether or not he is incarcerated. 
The McDonald decision affirmatively acknowledges 
that the appellant therein DID NOT properly present the 
"state constitutional claim" on appeal and the case was 
not thus adjudicated thereunder. The Court of Appeals 
ought not to cite to McDonald as authority to dispose 
of the Appellant's "state constitution" claims which 
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have properly raised and preserved! The weighty 
"constitutional right" under the Utah Constitution 
of a citizen's "right to a jury trial" was NOT DECIDED 
in the McDonald decision. Thus, McDonald is NOT 
precedent for the summary disposition of Appellant's 
claims, which should be more fully considered by the 
Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
That the Court of Appeals, while correctly 
adjudicating the "theft by deception" charge, can 
seemingly "transfer" the conviction to the "attempted 
theft" charge contained within the Information shows 
the necessity for the bill of particulars! That the 
Court of Appeals has properly, in the context of the 
"deception" charge overturned that conviction but 
nevertheless flip-flopped the charges establishes the 
judicial confusion of the case at hand. Obviously, the 
"confidence" in the proceedings below "has been eroded" 
such that a re-trial of the "attempted theft" charge is 
warranted! 
The Defendant has made a "credible argument" that 
the results might have been different, had the "bill of 
particulars" (identifying the specific items of 
property sought to have been stolen) been provided. 
The prosecuting attorney has not met the "shifted 
14 
burden" requirements imposed upon him of convincing the 
appellate court was "harmless error". Bell, supra, and 
Knight, supra. 
McDonald did NOT adjudicate nor create case-law 
precedent for the disposition of the "Utah 
Constitution" claims of denial of right to a jury 
trial. The Appellant's claims are valid and should be 
more fully considered. 
Following decision on the "jury trial" issue, the 
case should be remanded to the district court for 
trial, with instructions that the court require the 
prosecution to specifically identify the property which 
is subject to the "attempted theft" charge. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of April, 
2000. 
Attorney for Appellant 
JAMES WESTON DECKER 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING to be mailed, first-
class postage prepaid, to Mr Elliot R Lawrence, 
Attorney at Law, Office of the West Valley City 
Attorney, 3600 South Constitution Boulevard, West 
Valley City, Utah 84119, this 20th day of April, 2000. 
mw 
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Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Decker contends that the evidence adduced at trial was 
insufficient to support his convictions of attempted theft and 
theft by deception. We disagree that the evidence was 
insufficient to support Decker's attempted theft conviction. The 
evidence established that Decker removed some photographs from 
the City's file and hid them between two telephone books.1 
Decker then returned the file, minus the photographs. Decker 
later picked up the telephone books and left the building, 
unaware that City employees had retrieved the photographs while 
he paid for some copies. These facts sufficiently support the 
attempted theft conviction because they demonstrate that Decker 
"engage[d] in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the 
commission of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1999). 
In other words, the evidence adequately established that Decker 
attempted to "obtain [] or exercise [] unauthorized control over 
the property of [the City] with a purpose to deprive [it] 
thereof." Id. § 76-6-404. 
1. Although not important to our analysis, the City apparently 
provided the telephone books free to the public. 
The evidence, however, was not sufficient to support the 
conviction of theJ t by deception because Decker deceived no one 
in his attempt to steal the photos. See State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 
1263, 1267 (Utah 1982) (stating that "reliance by the victim 
[upon the deception] is an element of the crime of theft by 
deception"). The City employees saw Decker hide the photographs 
and then retrieve*, them when Decker left for a moment. Thus, we 
reverse Decker's theft by deception conviction because the 
statute does not . nclude "situations where theft by deception 
might have happened, but, because of the victim's lack of 
reliance on the perpetrator's deception, did not occur." State 
v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)." 
Decker also tontends that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion for a 1 ill cf particulars. "We will not reverse the 
trial court's decision to deny a bill of particulars unless the 
trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 
115, 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In this case, Decker had the 
following: the Information; the City's objection to his motion 
wherein the City set out the facts that led to the charges; and 
open access to the prosecution's file. Given all that the City 
provided Decker, the trial court did not aibuse its discretion in 
denying his request for a bill of particulars because it was 
111
 sufficient information "so that he [could] know the particulars 
of the alleged wrcngful conduct and [could] adequately prepare 
his defense."'" IcL_ at 117-18 (citations omitted). 
Finally, Decker argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his request for a jury trial. Because the charges against Decker 
carried maximum prison terms of six months or less, Decker was 
not entitled to a jury trial. See West Valley City v. McDonald, 
948 P.2d 371, 375 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Moreover, "the trial 
court agreed to eliminate jail time from its sentencing options," 
and therefore, "it no longer was required under Utah law to grant 
[Decker's] request for a jury trial." Id. at 3^4. 
2. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the theft by 
deception conviction, we need not address Decker's argument that 
the "single criminal episode" provision precludes prosecution of 
multiple offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999). 
990029-CA 2 
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction of attempted theft and 
reverse the conviction of theft by deception. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
990029-CA 3 
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